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Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

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1992

Year

TLDR

Economic sanctions against Iraq were organized by the United States after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and unilateral sanctions proved ineffective, making multilateral cooperation necessary. The study aims to analyze how multilateral sanctions become coercive and how they are formed. She tests her hypotheses against 99 sanction cases since 1945 and four detailed case studies—including the U.S.-led pipeline embargo, Soviet high‑technology sanctions, Latin American human‑rights sanctions, and British sanctions on Argentina. The study finds that multilateral sanctions are coercive both in their impact on targets and in their formation, with credible commitments and institutional involvement—alongside the sender’s willingness to bear heavy costs—being key to securing international cooperation.

Abstract

When Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States took the lead in organizing stringent economic sanctions against Iraq. Since unilateral sanctions rarely succeed, co-operation was a necessity. This innovative study shows that multilateral, or co-operative, sanctions are coercive not only in their pressure on their target but also in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one interested state attempting to convince other through persuasion, threats and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She tests her hypotheses against 99 cases of economic sanctions since 1945 and then against 4 detailed case studies - the U.S.-led pipeline embargo, high-technology sanctions against the Soviet Union, U.S. sanctions against Latin American nations for human rights violations, and British sanctions against Argentina during the Falklands War. Martin emphasizes that credible commitments gain international co-operation, and she concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main sender to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing credibility.