Economics and Politics · 1992 · 12 citations · 9 references
Social SciencesEconomicsPolitical ScienceGame TheoryPolitical BehaviorPolitical EconomyBehavioral Game TheoryGame Theory In CompetitionNash EquilibriumPolitical CompetitionPolitical StrategyStrategic InteractionExogenous ShocksGame-theoretic Equilibrium AnalysisIdeal PointsMover AdvantagePolicy SpaceSequential GamesSubgame Perfect Nash EquilibriumTwo-player Games
Two sequential games of the interactions among a PAC and two politicians contesting the same office are developed, and their subgame perfect equilibria are characterized. The politicians have distinct ideal points in policy space, and this drives the result that the policy platforms they campaign on are not identical. The PAC always contributes only to the politician whose platform is closest to the PAC's ideal point, who is the politician whose ideal point is closest to the PAC's ideal point; as a result, both politicians’policy platforms are closer to the PAC's ideal point. The sequence of play does not qualitatively affect the outcome, but the PAC has a second mover advantage. Exogenous shocks to the probabilities of winning only modify the basic outcome.
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Game Theory with Applications to Economics.
Ken Binmore, James W. Friedman, Peter C. Ordeshook · Economica · 1989 · 456 citations
Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach.
Edward A. Kuska, James M. Henderson, Richard E. Quandt · Economica · 1973 · 315 citations