Publication | Open Access
How Auctions Work for Wine and Art
674
Citations
9
References
1989
Year
Electronic AuctionArt ManagementEmpirical SurpriseMarket DesignFirst Wine AuctionExperimental EconomicsEconomic AnalysisAuction TheoryMechanism DesignEconomicsMarket MechanismPrice FormationArts MarketsWine AuctionsMarket BehaviorAuctions WorkMarketingBusinessEconomic Design
Wine and art auctions challenge the law of one price and reveal empirical regularities that existing auction theory has yet to explain. The study aims to collect data on wine and art auctions and report observed empirical regularities. Data were gathered by observing and recording auction sales of impressionist and contemporary paintings. The analysis uncovers several empirical regularities in the operation of wine and art auction markets.
At the first wine auction I ever attended, I saw the repeal of the law of one price. This empirical surprise led me to begin collecting data on wine auctions, to interview auctioneers, and even to buy a little wine. In the meantime I have also had the opportunity (with John Abowd) to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings. This paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that I and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items. In view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions, it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain.
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