Organization Studies · 2006 · 257 citations · 36 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsContract LawContract TheoryIt GovernanceProject GovernanceContract ManagementOpen ContractingOpen InnovationOpen LicensingOpen Source PolicyTransaction Cost EconomicsOpen Source Software LicensingOpen-source Software DevelopmentPositive Network EffectsTransaction Cost EfficienciesTransaction Cost ModelsTransactions
Open source is increasingly studied as a distinct phenomenon in the software industry. The authors propose bazaar governance—a new generic governance structure for open source projects—based on transaction cost economics and the open licence. They characterize bazaar governance by outlining its strengths and weaknesses and comparing it to market, firm, and network forms. Bazaar governance exhibits low control and weak incentive intensity, creating high uncertainty, yet its openness fosters strong positive network externalities and cumulative transaction efficiency, providing a foundation for future research.
A growing body of literature describes the open source phenomenon in the software industry. Drawing on transaction cost economics, we propose that open source projects illustrate a new generic governance structure — which we label bazaar governance — based on a specific legal contract: the open licence. We characterize this structure in terms of its strengths and weaknesses and compare it to market, firm and network forms. Low levels of control and weak incentives intensity are distinctive features of bazaar, lending a high uncertainty to governed transactions. However, bazaar governance promotes the openness of open source communities, which can generate strong positive network externalities and subsequent efficiency in cumulative transactions. Our theoretical developments offer a potential basis for future research.
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