Thunderstrike

Trammell Hudson, Larry Rudolph

2015 · 14 citations · 2 references

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TL;DR

Apple MacBook firmware flaws allow untrusted modifications to the SPI Flash boot ROM, enabling persistent bootkits that can evade detection and survive OS reinstallations and hard‑drive replacements. The malware spreads by installing copies onto Thunderbolt devices’ Option ROMs, enabling viral propagation across air‑gap security perimeters. Apple patched some flaws under CVE 2014‑4498, yet the lack of trusted hardware for boot‑time firmware validation means no straightforward fix exists for this vulnerability class.

Abstract

There are several flaws in Apple's MacBook firmware security that allows untrusted modifications to be written to the SPI Flash boot ROM of these laptops. This capability represents a new class of persistent firmware rootkits, or 'bootkits', for the popular Apple MacBook product line. Stealthy bootkits can conceal themselves from detection and prevent software attempts to remove them. Malicious modifications to the boot ROM are able to survive re-installation of the operating system and even hard-drive replacement. Additionally, the malware can install a copy of itself onto other Thunderbolt devices' Option ROMs as a means to spread virally across air-gap security perimeters. Apple has fixed some of these flaws as part of CVE 2014-4498, but there is no easy solution to this class of vulnerability, since the MacBook lacks trusted hardware to perform cryptographic validation of the firmware at boot time.

References

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