Is There an On-line Advertisers' Dilemma? A Study of Click Fraud in the Pay-Per-Click Model

TLDR

The study develops a theoretical model grounded in the theory of reasoned action and behavioral calculus to understand online advertiser behavior in the pay‑per‑click model. The authors employed structural equation modeling on survey data to test how beliefs about pay‑per‑click advertising shape attitudes and subjective norms, while examining the influence of trust, third‑party tools, and search engine support. Results show that attitudes and subjective norms drive intention to advertise online, with trust in search engines and third‑party monitoring tools significantly enhancing perceived benefits, attitudes, and ultimately advertising intention. Keywords: calculus of behavior, click fraud, individual behavior, online advertising, pay‑per‑click.

Abstract

Abstract This study develops a theoretical model, based on the theory of reasoned action and the concept of behavioral calculus, for understanding on-line advertiser behavior. Structural equation modeling and survey data are used to test hypotheses on how beliefs about on-line pay-per-click advertising shape the attitudes and subjective norms that lead advertisers to advertise on-line. The roles of trust, third-party tools, and support from search engine providers are explored. The study confirms that attitudes and subjective norms significantly influence intention to advertise on-line using the pay-per-click model, but trust in search engine providers and third-party monitoring and filtering tools are also found to have central roles. Trust can significantly increase the perceived benefits, in addition to its direct positive impact on attitude and subjective norms. The perceived effectiveness of third-party tools has a positive impact on attitude and trust, and thus on intention to advertise on-line. Keywords: Calculus of behaviorclick fraudindividual behavioron-line advertisingpay-per-click