Publication | Closed Access
The Role of Aggregators in Smart Grid Demand Response Markets
470
Citations
12
References
2013
Year
EngineeringEfficient Demand ResponseMarket DesignOperations ResearchPricing PolicyPower MarketMechanism DesignQuantitative ManagementEnergy Demand ManagementDemand ManagementEconomicsDynamic PricingComputer ScienceHierarchical Market ModelMarketingElectricity MarketSmart GridEnergy ManagementEnergy PolicyBusinessDemand ResponseElectricity MarketsMicroeconomics
Demand Response mechanisms for residential users face challenges because of many users and each user's negligible market impact. The study proposes a hierarchical market model in which aggregators mediate between the utility operator and home users. The operator minimizes grid cost and rewards aggregators, who compete to sell DR services and compensate users, while users balance earnings against discomfort, and the model examines both a cost‑minimizing benchmark with full information and a self‑interested non‑cooperative market. The market scheme captures diverse objectives and, compared to flat pricing, yields significant benefits for all parties; realistic demand traces quantify these benefits, yet users highly willing to shift consumption do not gain maximum advantage.
The design of efficient Demand Response (DR) mechanisms for the residential sector entails significant challenges, due to the large number of home users and the negligible impact of each of them on the market. In this paper, we introduce a hierarchical market model for the smart grid where a set of competing aggregators act as intermediaries between the utility operator and the home users. The operator seeks to minimize the smart grid operational cost and offers rewards to aggregators toward this goal. Profit-maximizing aggregators compete to sell DR services to the operator and provide compensation to end-users in order to modify their preferable consumption pattern. Finally, end-users seek to optimize the tradeoff between earnings received from the aggregator and discomfort from having to modify their pattern. Based on this market model, we first address the benchmark scenario from the point of view of a cost-minimizing operator that has full information about user demands. Then, we consider a DR market, where all entities are self-interested and non-cooperative. The proposed market scheme captures the diverse objectives of the involved entities and, compared to flat pricing, guarantees significant benefits for each. Using realistic demand traces, we quantify the arising DR benefits. Interestingly, users that are extremely willing to modify their consumption pattern do not derive maximum benefit.
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