Concepedia

TLDR

Existing organizational research offers limited insight into the processes of technologically complex, high‑risk organizations. The study aims to define the organizational processes required for safe operation of such technologically complex, high‑risk organizations. The authors analyze nuclear‑powered aircraft carriers, applying Perrow’s risk components and Shrivastava’s catastrophe antecedents to illustrate how these carriers mitigate potential hazards. The paper concludes by proposing directions for future research.

Abstract

This paper is concerned with defining organizational processes necessary to operate safely technologically complex organizations that can do great physical harm to themselves and their surrounding environments. The paper first argues that existing organizational research is little help in understanding organizational processes in such organizations. It then identifies nuclear powered aircraft carriers as examples of potentially hazardous organizations with histories of excellent operations. The paper then examines a set of components of “risk” identified by Perrow (1984) and antecedents to catastrophe elucidated by Shrivastava (1986) and discusses how carriers deal with these factors to lessen their potentially negative effects. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research.

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