Calculation, Community and Cues

TLDR

The article reviews and extends theories of public opinion on European integration, testing economic calculus and communal identity using Eurobarometer data and theorizing how identity’s political consequences are contested and cued in national contexts. Using multi‑level Eurobarometer data, the authors test economic calculus and communal identity theories and examine how identity’s political consequences are contested and cued in national contexts. Economic calculus and communal identity both influence public opinion, with identity having a stronger effect; elite division cues citizens—especially those with exclusive national identity—to oppose integration, and a combined model explains about a quarter of individual variation and most national and party‑level variation.

Abstract

This article summarizes and extends the main lines of theorizing on public opinion on European integration. We test theories of economic calculus and communal identity in a multi-level analysis of Eurobarometer data. Both economic calculus and communal identity are influential, but the latter is stronger than the former. We theorize how the political consequences of identity are contested and shaped - that is to say, politically cued - in national contexts. The more national elites are divided, the more citizens are cued to oppose European integration, and this effect is particularly pronounced among citizens who see themselves as exclusively national. A model that synthesizes economic, identity, and cue theory explains around one-quarter of variation at the individual level and the bulk of variation at the national and party levels.