A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms

Candace Jones, William S. Hesterly, Stephen P. Borgatti

Academy of Management Review · 1997 · 2.2K citations · 129 references

TL;DR

Rapid rise of network governance over the past two decades has attracted scholarly attention, yet no comprehensive theory or detailed definition has been advanced. The authors aim to develop a theory that explains when rigorously defined network governance has comparative advantage and is likely to emerge and thrive. Their theory blends transaction‑cost economics and social‑network theory, asserting that asset specificity, demand uncertainty, task complexity, and frequency drive firms to embed transactions structurally and employ social mechanisms for coordination and safeguarding. When all these conditions are met, network governance possesses comparative advantage.

Abstract

A phenomenon of the last 20 years has been the rapid rise of the network form of governance. This governance form has received significant scholarly attention, but. to date, no comprehensive theory for it has been advanced, and no sufficiently detailed and theoretically consistent definition has appeared. Our objective in this article is to provide a theory that explains under what conditions network governance, rigorously defined, has comparative advantage and is therefore likely to emerge and thrive. Our theory integrates transaction cost economics and social network theories, and, in broad strokes, asserts that the network form of governance is a response to exchange conditions of asset specificity, demand uncertainty, task complexity, and frequency. These exchange conditions drive firms toward structurally embedding their transactions, which enables firms to use social mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding exchanges. When all of these conditions are in place, the network governance form has adv...

References

129