Preventing Client Side XSS with Rewrite Based Dynamic Information Flow

Abstract

This paper presents the design and implementation of an information flow tracking framework based on code rewrite to prevent sensitive information leaks in browsers, combining the ideas of taint and information flow analysis. Our system has two main processes. First, it abstracts the semantic of JavaScript code and converts it to a general form of intermediate representation on the basis of JavaScript abstract syntax tree. Second, the abstract intermediate representation is implemented as a special taint engine to analyze tainted information flow. Our approach can ensure fine-grained isolation for both confidentiality and integrity of information. We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype, named JSTFlow, and have deployed it as a browser proxy to rewrite web applications at runtime. The experiment results show that JSTFlow can guarantee the security of sensitive data and detect XSS attacks with about 3x performance overhead. Because it does not involve any modifications to the target system, our system is readily deployable in practice.