Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the eu regulatory state

Burkard Eberlein, Edgar Grande

Journal of European Public Policy · 2005 · 408 citations · 43 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The EU faces a dilemma: while uniform rules are increasingly needed for the internal market, most regulatory powers remain at the national level, creating a supranational regulatory gap. This article investigates how regulatory authority is allocated in the EU, critiques existing delegation models, and argues that transnational regulatory networks partly fill the supranational gap. The authors introduce the concept of a regulatory regime to critique earlier accounts of the EU regulatory state and current delegation approaches. Regulatory networks can provide a back‑road to informal Europeanization of government regulation, but this informalization is vulnerable to distributive conflict and raises unresolved democratic legitimacy problems.

Abstract

This article investigates the allocation of regulatory authority in the EU. By introducing the concept of a 'regulatory regime', it criticizes not only earlier accounts of the EU 'regulatory state', but also current delegation approaches. As a starting point, it identifies a dilemma for the EU regulatory policy. Despite the rising need for uniform EU-level rules in the internal market, the bulk of formal powers and the institutional focus of regulatory activities continue to be located at the national level. This results in a supranational regulatory gap. Our thesis is that this gap is partly filled by transnational regulatory networks. Under certain conditions, regulatory networks offer a back road to the informal Europeanization of government regulation. However, the informalization of governance is vulnerable to strong distributive conflict, and, if effective, it raises unresolved problems of democratic legitimacy.

References

43