The Journal of Politics · 2014 · 186 citations · 32 references
Social SciencesEconomicsPolitical ScienceAmerican PoliticsLegislative PoliticsLegislative StudiesElectionsIncumbency AdvantageInterest Group InfluenceInterest Group ParticipationPolitical ContributionsVoting BehaviorCampaign Finance AdvantageCausal Effect IdentificationCausal ReasoningEffect SizeElection Campaign EffectsElectoral AssistanceLegislative Incumbency AdvantagePublic Interest Groups
In this article, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of incumbency on campaign contributions in the U.S. House and state legislatures. In both settings, incumbency causes approximately a 20-25 percentage-point increase in the share of donations flowing to the incumbent's party. The effect size does not vary with legislator experience and does not appear to depend on incumbent office-holder benefits. Instead, as we show, the effect is primarily the result of donations from access-oriented interest groups, especially donors from industries under heavy regulation and those with less ideological ties. Given the role of money in elections, the findings suggest that access-oriented interest groups are an important driver of the electoral security of incumbents.
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