Review of Network Economics · 2010 · 25 citations · 16 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsCompetition PolicyFinancial EconomicsPricing TheoryConsumer TheoryHotelling RuleTransaction Cost EconomicsEntryHotelling ModelHotelling Price CompetitionIndustry DynamicsMerchant Acceptance RulesPayment Cards
This short article explains why merchants accept expensive payment cards when merchants are Cournot competitors. The same acceptance rule as the Hotelling price competition model of Rochet and Tirole (2002) is derived. Unlike the models used in the existing literature, in the Cournot setting without free entry of merchants, payment card acceptance expands merchant output and increases merchant profit in equilibrium. With free entry, payment card acceptance increases the number of merchants in the industry and industry output.
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Network externalities, competition, and compatibility
Michael L. Katz · American Economic Review · 1985 · 6.2K citations
Julian Wright · European Economic Review · 2002 · 208 citations
COMPETING PAYMENT SCHEMES<sup>*</sup>
Graeme Guthrie, Julian Wright · Journal of Industrial Economics · 2007 · 137 citations