Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems

Abstract

List of tables and figures Series editor's preface Preface PART I. INTRODUCTION: 1. Introduction 2. Duverger's propositions PART II. STRATEGIC VOTING: 3. On electoral systems 4. Strategic voting in single-member single-ballot systems 5. Strategic voting in multimember districts 6. Strategic voting in single-member dual-ballot systems 7. Some concluding comments on strategic voting, PART III. STRATEGIC ENTRY: 8. Strategic voting, party labels and entry 9. Rational entry and the conservation of disproportionality: evidence from Japan PART IV. ELECTORAL COORDINATION AT THe SYSTEM LEVEL: 10. Putting the constituencies together 11. Electoral institutions, cleavage structures and the number of parties PART V. COORDINATION FAILURES AND THE DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE: 12. Coordination failures and representation 13. Coordination failures and dominant parties 14. Coordination failures and realignments PART VI. CONCLUSION 15. Conclusion Appendices References Subject index Author index.