International Governance as New Raison d’État? the Case of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

Abstract

Various scholars have suggested that at times national governments use international cooperation to gain influence in the domestic political arena and to overcome internal opposition to their preferred policies. Klaus Dieter Wolf has argued that this practice represents the latest embodiment of a longstanding raison d’état and has provided theoretical foundations for its systematic study. This article assesses the usefulness of this ‘new raison d’état’ thesis as a source of empirical hypotheses about the origins and persistence of international institutions. On the basis of the general logic of the argument, I develop one crucial implication that may be corroborated by cross-national research. In the light of this, the preferences of European governments regarding the institutional depth of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy are examined. Overall, the findings presented in this article confirm that ‘collusive delegation’ can be a significant factor in the creation of international governance arrangements.