Psychological Review · 2013 · 206 citations · 110 references
Natural SciencesPhysicsPsychologyCausal InferenceExperimental PsychologyUncertainty QuantificationClassical MechanicsCognitive ModelingStatistical InferenceStatistical ReasoningUncertainty EstimationUncertainty ReasoningCausalityNewtonian MechanicsPerceptual HeuristicsPhysical PropertiesPhysical ReasoningReasoning About UncertaintyReasoning ModelsUncertainty-aware Explanations
People intuitively judge the effects of colliding objects, but these judgments often deviate from Newtonian mechanics, leading psychologists to propose task‑specific heuristics. The study seeks to determine how to select such heuristics and integrate them into a unified model that explains human judgments across diverse physical reasoning tasks. The authors propose a noisy Newton framework that models judgments as optimal statistical inference over a Newtonian physical model incorporating sensory noise and uncertainty about object properties, applied across many judgments. The framework explains mass‑judgment effects previously attributed to heuristics as arising from Newtonian constraints and sensory uncertainty, and it also predicts causality judgments with strong quantitative agreement across tasks using a single parameter set.
People have strong intuitions about the influence objects exert upon one another when they collide. Because people's judgments appear to deviate from Newtonian mechanics, psychologists have suggested that people depend on a variety of task-specific heuristics. This leaves open the question of how these heuristics could be chosen, and how to integrate them into a unified model that can explain human judgments across a wide range of physical reasoning tasks. We propose an alternative framework, in which people's judgments are based on optimal statistical inference over a Newtonian physical model that incorporates sensory noise and intrinsic uncertainty about the physical properties of the objects being viewed. This noisy Newton framework can be applied to a multitude of judgments, with people's answers determined by the uncertainty they have for physical variables and the constraints of Newtonian mechanics. We investigate a range of effects in mass judgments that have been taken as strong evidence for heuristic use and show that they are well explained by the interplay between Newtonian constraints and sensory uncertainty. We also consider an extended model that handles causality judgments, and obtain good quantitative agreement with human judgments across tasks that involve different judgment types with a single consistent set of parameters.
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