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Communications to the Editor—A Counterexample in Game Theory
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1967
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Informal ConferenceNon-cooperative Game TheoryCommunication EffectsCombinatorial GameGame TheoryArtsBusinessDynamics In Game TheoryNetwork EconomicsStatic Game TheoryCommunicationGamesN-person GamesUnique SolutionBehavioral Game TheoryMechanism DesignAlgorithmic Game Theory
This note describes a 5-person von Neumann-Morgenstern game which has a unique solution that is strictly larger than its core. This game provides a counterexample for the following two conjectures stated by L. S. Shapley in [Kuhn, H. W., ed. Report of an Informal Conference on the Theory of n-Person Games, held at Princeton University, March 20–21, 1953 (dittoed).].