Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts

TLDR

Corruption, deeply embedded in social and political relations, can trigger armed conflict when its patterns shift—especially during shocks—as competitive corruption fuels war, while buying off belligerents may promote peace but sanctions remain the primary international tool. The study aims to show how peace‑building initiatives and fiscal reforms can redirect incentives away from immediate corrupt gains to reduce conflict. The authors propose that placing public revenues under international supervision during peace processes can facilitate this incentive shift. © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Abstract

Abstract Although corruption may have a corrosive effect on economies and rule‐based institutions, it also forms part of the fabric of social and political relationships. This endogenous character means that conflict may be engendered more by changes in the pattern of corruption than by the existence of corruption itself. Such changes, frequently associated with domestic or external shocks, can lead to armed conflict as increasingly violent forms of competitive corruption between factions ‘fuel war’ by rewarding belligerents. Controversially, ‘buying‐off’ belligerents can facilitate a transition to peace; but ‘sticks’ such as economic sanctions, rather than ‘carrots’, have dominated international conflict resolution instruments. While ‘buying peace’ can present a short‐term solution, the key challenge for peace‐building initiatives and fiscal reforms is to shift individual incentives and rewards away from the competition for immediate corrupt gains. This may be facilitated by placing public revenues under international supervision during peace processes. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.