Journal of Political Economy · 1995 · 637 citations · 9 references
Social SciencesEconomicsResource EconomicsGame TheoryResource ScarcitySecurity StudiesDefense Of PropertyProperty Rights EconomicsResource SecurityActivitiesDefense Resource AllocationEconomic WelfareEquilibriumGeneral Equilibrium EfficiencyProperty Rights SecuritySecurity Interests In Property
The paper develops a general equilibrium model to analyze how resources are allocated between appropriative and productive activities. The model distinguishes offensive weapons from defensive fortifications, examines a nonaggressive equilibrium with no offensive weapons, and explores how economic welfare relates to property claim security. The analysis shows that equilibrium security of property claims depends on the allocation of resources, and that a poorer agent may be better off when claims are less secure.
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive activities. The model emphasizes the distinction between offensive weapons, which are the instruments of predation, and fortifications, which provide defense against predation. The analysis of this model shows how the equilibrium security of claims to property is determined. The analysis focuses on the possibility of a nonaggressive equilibrium, in which no resources are allocated to offensive weapons and claims to property are fully secure. We also analyze the complex relation between economic welfare and the security of claims to property. We find, for example, that a relatively poor agent could be better off in an equilibrium with less secure claims to property.
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A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections
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A Study in the Theory of Economic Evolution.
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