Journal of Forecasting · 1982 · 121 citations · 45 references
BusinessDecision SciencesCausal InferenceDiagnostic ReasoningForecastingCausal ForecastingForecast EvaluationForecasting MethodsProbabilistic ForecastingTime Series PredictionCausal Inference In DiagnosisCausal Inference In PredictionCausalityForecast Performance EvaluationPrediction MakingPredictive ReasoningPredictive ValiditySpurious Correlation
Abstract While forecasting involves forward/predictive thinking, it depends crucially on prior diagnosis for suggesting a model of the phenomenon, for defining‘relevant’variables, and for evaluating forecast accuracy via the model. The nature of diagnostic thinking is examined with respect to these activities. We first consider the difficulties of evaluating forecast accuracy without a causal model of what generates outcomes. We then discuss the development of models by considering how attention is directed to variables via analogy and metaphor as well as by what is unusual or abnormal. The causal relevance of variables is then assessed by reference to probabilistic signs called‘cues to causality’. These are: temporal order, constant conjunction, contiguity in time and space, number of alternative explanations, similarity, predictive validity, and robustness. The probabilistic nature of the cues is emphasized by discussing the concept of spurious correlation and how causation does not necessarily imply correlation. Implications for improving forecasting are considered with respect to the above issues.
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Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
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