Review of Financial Studies · 1999 · 174 citations · 54 references
Public AffairsEconomicsFinanceCorporate FinanceFinancial EconomicsMacroeconomicsBankruptcyDebt DefaultDebt DynamicsDebt ManagementDebt RestructuringCorporate Debt DefaultDebt DecompositionDebt Restructuring ModelingDefault Resolution Mechanisms
This article documents the fact that when debtors decide to default on their obligations too early, it is in the creditors' collective interest, as residual claimants, to make concessions prior to forcing a costly liquidation. Symmetrically, when debtors prefer to default at an inefficiently late stage, it is in the creditors' interest to propose a departure from the absolute priority rule. This article develops a continuous time pricing model of dynamic debt restructuring that reflects the crucial influence of the two counterparties' relative bargaining power. Simple and intuitive path-dependent pricing formulae are derived for equity and debt. The debt capacity as well as the evolution of the firm's capital structure throughout its existence is provided.
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ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Robert C. Merton · The Journal of Finance · 1974 · 11K citations · Full text
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Oliver Hart, John Moore · Journal of Political Economy · 1990 · 5.4K citations · Full text
Merton H. Miller · The Journal of Finance · 1977 · 3K citations · Full text