Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade

Wayne Sandholtz, William Koetzle

International Studies Quarterly · 2000 · 463 citations · 32 references

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TL;DR

Corruption undermines democratic governance and market economies, yet comparative political science research on it has only recently emerged. The study seeks to explain variation in perceived corruption levels across fifty countries. The authors hypothesize that corruption rises when average income is low, state control is high, democratic norms are weak, international integration is low, and Protestant population share is low. Regression analysis confirms that each of these factors is significantly associated with higher corruption in the predicted direction.

Abstract

Though corruption poses fundamental challenges to both democratic governance and market economies, political science research has only recently begun to address corruption in a comparative context. In this article we explain variation in the perceived level of corruption (defined as the misuse of public office for private gain) across fifty countries. We propose a set of hypotheses that explain variation in corruption levels in terms of domestic political-economic structure, democratic norms, integration into the international economy, and Protestant religious affiliation. Levels of corruption, we propose, are higher: (1) the lower the average income level, (2) the greater the extent of state control of the economy, (3) the weaker are democratic norms and institutions, (4) the lower the degree of integration in the world economy, and (5) the lower the share of the population with Protestant religious affiliation. The data analysis broadly confirms our predictions: in the multivariate regression, each of the independent variables is significant in the direction we expect.

References

32