The Journal of Development Studies · 1996 · 52 citations · 22 references
AgricultureEconomicsFinanceAgency TheoryBankingRural EconomicsMicrofinanceRural BankingRural EconomyRural FinanceRural Financial InstitutionsRural InstitutionsIncentive MechanismsIncentive ProvisionRural Credit AccessRural Credit ConstraintsRural Credit InstitutionsRural Credit PolicyRural Financial IntermediationVillage Banks
Using a simple principal-agent model this article examines the incentive problems that arise when a formal financial institution (such as a rural bank) utilises a member of the rural community to act as an agent in screening potential borrowers and collecting repayment. Optimal compensation schemes are derived for the agent and their implications are discussed. In addition, I show that the norms and rules that govern village life may aid the financial institution by helping to constrain possible strategic behaviour by the agent.
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An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver Hart · Econometrica · 1983 · 2.1K citations
Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets
Joseph E. Stiglitz · The World Bank Economic Review · 1990 · 1.3K citations · Full text
D.B. Needham, Cliff Lloyd · Economica · 1968 · 1.3K citations
Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral
Timothy Besley, Stephen Coate · Journal of Development Economics · 1995 · 1.2K citations · Full text
Management, Economics, Finance +13