Modeling and characterization of GPS spoofing

Abstract

The Global Positioning System (GPS) grows into a ubiquitous utility that provides positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services. As an essential element of the global information infrastructure, cyber security of GPS faces serious challenges. Some mission-critical systems even rely on GPS as a security measure. However, civilian GPS itself has no protection against malicious acts such as spoofing. GPS spoofing breaches authentication by forging satellite signals to mislead users with wrong location/timing data that threatens homeland security. In order to make civilian GPS secure and resilient for diverse applications, we must understand the nature of attacks. This paper proposes a novel attack modeling of GPS spoofing with event-driven simulation package. Simulation supplements usual experiments to limit incidental harms and to comprehend a surreptitious scenario. We also provide taxonomy of GPS spoofing through characterization. The work accelerates the development of defense technology against GPS-based attacks.