IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · 2013 · 217 citations · 14 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringCybersecurityComputer SecurityGlobal Navigation Satellite SystemsHardware SecuritySatellite OrbitsTime SynchronizationClock Offset EstimationClock Synchronization ErrorGlobal Navigation Satellite System Time SynchronizationPhasor Measurement UnitsPhasor VariablesSpoofingSpoofing Attack ModelingSpoofing Mitigation
An error in a PMU’s receiver clock offset causes proportional phase errors in its voltage or current measurements. The study demonstrates the feasibility of spoofing a PMU’s GPS receiver clock offset. The attack is formulated as an optimization problem that maximizes the change in the PMU’s receiver clock offset while keeping satellite ephemerides, pseudoranges, and ECEF coordinates close to pre‑attack values to avoid detection. The attack is feasible with any number of visible satellites and can induce errors in real‑time voltage stability monitoring algorithms that rely on PMU phase data.
We demonstrate the feasibility of a spoofing attack on the GPS receiver of a phasor measurement unit (PMU). We formulate the attack as an optimization problem where the objective is to maximize the difference between the PMU's receiver clock offset (with respect to the GPS time measured by the onboard satellite clocks) before and after the attack. Since the PMU uses this clock offset to compute a synchronized time stamp for its measurements, an error in the receiver clock offset introduces a proportional phase error in the voltage or current phase measurements provided by the PMU. For the most general case, the decision variables in the optimization problem are the satellites' ephemerides, pseudoranges, and the receiver's Earth-Centered Earth-Fixed (ECEF) coordinates. The constraints are cast such that the decision variables and the satellite positions computed from the solution of the optimization problem are close to their pre-attack values, so as to avoid possible detection schemes that check for large jumps in the values of these variables. We show that the spoofing attack is feasible for any number of visible satellites. As an illustration of the impact of such spoofing attacks, we present simulation results in which the attack induces errors in a real-time voltage stability monitoring algorithm that relies on the phase information from measurements provided by PMUs.
14