Mechanisms in the Analysis of Social Macro-Phenomena

Renate Mayntz

Philosophy of the Social Sciences · 2004 · 607 citations · 28 references

DOIFull text

Open access

Concepts

TL;DR

In social science, the term “mechanism” is widely used yet ambiguously defined, and scholars criticize correlational and covering‑law approaches for their explanatory limits, favoring causal reconstructions of macro‑phenomena, though systematic treatments of institutional generative mechanisms remain scarce. The article aims to clarify the conceptual issues surrounding the term “social mechanisms” and to define it as recurrent processes that generate specific outcomes. The authors explain social macro‑phenomena by employing causal regression to lower‑level elements, following methodological individualism.

Abstract

The term “(social) mechanism” is frequently encountered in the social science literature, but there is considerable confusion about the exact meaning of the term. The article begins by addressing the main conceptual issues. Use of this term is the hallmark of an approach that is critical of the explanatory deficits of correlational analysis and of the covering-law model, advocating instead the causal reconstruction of the processes that account for given macro-phenomena. The term “social mechanisms” should be used to refer to recurrent processes generating a specific kind of outcome. Explanation of social macro-phenomena by mechanisms typically involves causal regression to lower-level elements, as stipulated by methodological individualism. While there exist a good many mechanism models to explain emergent effects of collective behavior, we lack a similarly systematic treatment of generative mechanisms in which institutions and specific kinds of structural configurations play the decisive role.

References

28