Recruiting multi-antenna transmitters as cooperative jammers: An auction-theoretic approach

Abstract

This paper proposes and investigates a distributed mechanism that motivates otherwise non-cooperative terminals to participate as cooperative jammers assisting a source-destination pair that communicates over a wireless medium, in the presence of an eavesdropper from whom the communicated messages need to be kept secret. The cooperation incentive is provided by an opportunity for potential jammers, possibly equipped with multiple antennas, to utilize the spectrum belonging to the ongoing secure transmission for their own data traffic. A fully decentralized framework is put forth through a competition of potential cooperative jammers for spectrum access by trying to make the jamming offer that most improves the secrecy rate of the source-destination pair. Effective arbitration of cooperative jamming is performed using auction theory, with the source in the role of the auctioneer, and the jammers acting as bidders. The proposed scheme can be alternatively seen as a practical basis for the implementation of cognitive radio networks operating according to the property-rights model, i.e., spectrum leasing.