Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS' Activism

Claire E. Crutehley, Carl D. Hudson, Marlin R. H. Jensen

Financial Services Review · 1998 · 37 citations · 7 references

DOIFull text

Open access

Concepts

Abstract


 
 
 In the past decade, institutional investors have become more active in monitoring man- agement and voting the shares they control. The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CaIPERS) was a leader in this wave of activism. This study investi- gates the long-term returns an investor with public information could earn by buying a portfolio offirms targeted by CaIPERS and whether the success of CaIPERS' activism depends on the aggressiveness of the targeting. The evidence supports the idea that vis- ible and aggressive activism leads to substantial increases in shareholder wealth while a quieter activism does not.
 
 

References

7