Energy Consumption Side-Channel Attack at Virtual Machines in a Cloud

Abstract

Virtualized data centers where several virtual machines (VMs) are hosted per server are becoming more popular due to Cloud Computing. As a consequence of energy efficiency concerns, the exact combination of VMs running on a specific server will most likely change over time. We present experimental results how to use the energy/power consumption logs of a power monitored server as a side-channel that allows us to recognize the exact combination of VMs it currently hosts to a high degree. For classification, we use a maximum log-likelihood approach, which works well for comparably small training and test set sizes. We also show to which degree a specific VM can be recognized, regardless of other VMs currently running on the same server, and show false negative/positive rates. To cross-validate our results, we have used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, resulting in comparable quality of recognition within shorter time. In order to clarify whether our approach is generalizable and yields reproducible results, we have set up a second experimental infrastructure in Lyon, using a different hardware platform and power measurement device. We have obtained similar results and have experimented with different CPU frequency scaling governors, yielding comparable quality of recognition. As a result, energy consumption data of servers must be protected carefully, as it is potentially valuable information for an attacker trying to track down a VM to mount further attack steps.