Cognitive Science · 2009 · 50 citations · 18 references
Social SciencesEconomicsExperimental DesignExperimental EconomicsGame TheoryBehavioral Game TheoryGame Theory In CompetitionNash EquilibriumResource CompetitionStrategic InteractionCompetition Over ResourcesGame-theoretic AllocationMatching Games
When two agents of unequal strength compete, the stronger one is expected to always win the competition. This expectation is based on the assumption that evaluation of performance is complete, hence flawless. If, however, the agents are evaluated on the basis of only a small sample of their performance, the weaker agent still stands a chance of winning occasionally. A theoretical analysis indicates that, to increase the chance of this happening the weaker agent ought to give up on enough occasions so that he or she can match the stronger agent on the remaining ones. We model such a competition in a game, present its game-theoretic solution, and report an experiment, involving 144 individuals, in which we tested whether players (both weak and strong) are actually sensitive to their relative strengths and know how to allocate their resources accordingly. Our results indicate that they do.
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The all-pay auction with complete information
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