Networks and Heterogeneous Media · 2012 · 166 citations · 11 references
Social SciencesEconomicsMathematicsDynamical SystemsGame TheoryStochastic ProcessesBehavioral Game TheoryBellman EquationsNash EquilibriumOptimal ControlStochastic Differential EquationsStochastic GamesDifferential GamesFokker - Planck EquationFokker-planck EquationsHamilton - Jacobi - Bellman EquationsHamilton-jacobi-bellman EquationsMean-field ModelsMean-field Stochastic Differential EquationsWhite Noise
We consider $N$-person differential games involving linear systems affected by white noise, running cost quadratic in the control and in the displacement of the state from a reference position, and withlong-time-average integral cost functional. We solve an associated system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equations and find explicit Nash equilibria in the form of linear feedbacks. Next we compute the limit as the number $N$ of players goes to infinity, assuming they are almost identical and with suitable scalings of the parameters. This provides a quadratic-Gaussian solution to a system of two differential equations of the kind introduced by Lasry and Lions in the theory of Mean Field Games [22]. Under a natural normalization the uniqueness of this solution depends on the sign of a single parameter. We also discuss some singular limits, such as vanishing noise, cheap control, vanishing discount. Finally, we compare the L-Q model with other Mean Field models of population distribution.
11
Jean‐Michel Lasry, Pierre-Louis Lions · Japanese journal of mathematics · 2007 · 2.6K citations
Markets with a Continuum of Traders
Robert J. Aumann · Econometrica · 1964 · 1.2K citations
Dynamic noncooperative game theory
European Journal of Operational Research · 1995 · 1.1K citations