Concepedia

The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives

American Economic Review · 2001 · 837 citations · 26 references

TL;DR

Politicians focused on office spoils may underprovide public goods because their benefits are harder to target than pork‑barrel spending. The study compares winner‑take‑all and proportional electoral systems to evaluate their impact on public‑good provision, including an analysis of the electoral college. The authors model electoral incentives, contrasting spoils allocation in winner‑take‑all versus proportional systems, and extend the analysis to the electoral college. Winner‑take‑all systems reduce public‑good provision relative to proportional systems, especially when the good is highly desirable, and the electoral college is particularly prone to this inefficiency. JEL codes: D82, L15.

Abstract

Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a winner-take-all system—where all the spoils go to the winner—to a proportional system—where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote. In a winner-take-all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable. We then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency. It is particularly subject to this inefficiency. (JEL D82, L15)