ANTIDUMPING POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: POLITICAL DISCRETION OR TECHNICAL DETERMINATION

Abstract

This paper demonstrates the prominent role of antidumping laws as an instrument of endogenous trade policy in the EC. In contrast with the U.S. where anti‐dumping decisions are largely subject to technical determination and trade barriers result from protectionist rules, the EC application of antidumping laws provides protection through administrative discretion and political influence on administrators. Whereas political influence seems to have increased over time in the U.S., the results of our empirical analysis of the EC antidumping decisions in the 1980 to 1990 period indicate that it has been curbed by the increased formalization of the antidumping investigation in the EC in this period. The estimation results show, however, that the tightening impact of each of the three institutional changes during this period faded within two years.