International Security · 2014 · 157 citations · 54 references
Social SciencesPolitical ScienceStrategyInternational SecuritySecurity PolicySecurity StudiesNational SecurityNonproliferation PolicyNuclear NonproliferationNuclear ProliferationNuclear StrategyWeapons ProliferationActorsDeterrence Of ProliferationNuclear Weapons ProliferationState Proliferation Behavior
States acquire nuclear weapons when they possess both willingness—driven by a grave security threat without reliable ally protection—and opportunity, defined by high relative power or powerful ally support. The study develops a strategic theory of nuclear proliferation that incorporates the security goals of the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and allies. The authors construct a strategic framework modeling the interactions among proliferators, adversaries, and allies to explain nuclear acquisition. The theory predicts that only powerful states or weak states with unreliable allies acquire nuclear weapons, a claim corroborated by historical cases such as the Soviet Union, Iraq, Pakistan, South Korea, and West Germany.
When do states acquire nuclear weapons? To address this question, a strategic theory of nuclear proliferation must take into account the security goals of all of the key actors: the potential proliferator, its adversaries, and, when present, its allies. To acquire nuclear weapons, a state must possess both the willingness and the opportunity to proliferate. Willingness requires the presence of a grave security threat against which no ally offers reliable protection. Opportunity requires that the state pursuing nuclear weapons possess high relative power vis-à-vis its adversaries or enjoy the protection of a powerful ally. Whereas a relatively weak state without a powerful ally lacks the opportunity to develop a nuclear capability, one with such an ally lacks the willingness to do so. Therefore, only powerful states or relatively weak states with allies that do not guarantee fulfillment of at least some of their key security goals will acquire the bomb. These claims are supported by the overall pattern of nuclear proliferation as well as detailed analyses of the Soviet, Iraqi, Pakistani, South Korean, and West German nuclear development cases.
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