International Studies Quarterly · 2010 · 228 citations · 35 references
LawInternational LawInternational RelationsForeign Direct InvestmentInternational Dispute SettlementInternational Investment LawDispute ResolutionForeign Direct Investment LawForeign Direct Investment RegulationForeign Investment RegulationInternational CooperationInvestment TreatiesArbitration Of Investment DisputesForeign Direct Investment ContractsInternational Economic InstitutionsInterstate ArbitrationInvestment Treaty InterpretationInvestment Treaty JurisdictionInvestment Treaty RegimesSettlement Of Investment Disputes
Bilateral investment treaties dominate foreign direct investment rules, yet they differ markedly in whether they permit disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. By compiling and coding nearly 1,500 treaty texts, the authors identified systematic variation in legal delegation to ICISD and explained this pattern using a bargaining framework. Home governments tend to secure ICISD clauses when internal pressures and bargaining power are high, but are less likely to demand them if they share historical or military ties with the counterparty, while host governments—despite generally opposing ICISD clauses—are more willing to accept them when heavily dependent on the global economy, underscoring important implications for FDI, legalization, international institutions, and interstate bargaining.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the dominant source of rules on foreign direct investment (FDI), yet these treaties vary significantly in at least one important respect: whether they allow investment disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Through the compilation and careful coding of the text of nearly 1,500 treaties, we identify systematic variation in "legal delegation" to ICSID across BITs and explain this important variation by drawing upon a bargaining framework. Home governments prefer and typically obtainICSID clauses in their BITs, particularly when internal forces push strongly for such provisions and when they have significantly greater bargaining power than the other signatory. Yet some home governments are less likely to insist uponICSID clauses if they have historical or military ties with the other government. On the other hand, although host governments are often hostile towardICSID clauses, particularly when sovereignty costs are high, they are more likely to consent to such clauses when they are heavily constrained by their dependence on the global economy. Our findings have significant implications for those interested in FDI, legalization, international institutions, and interstate bargaining.
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