In the Business of Peace: The Political Influence of Private Military and Security Companies on UN Peacekeeping

Abstract

Abstract Private military and security companies increasingly perform services for the UN. The article describes how these companies are used by the UN organization and become part of UN operations. Their participation influences the planning and implementation of UN peacekeeping. By performing tasks such as protective security, security training, peacekeeper training, counselling and intelligence, private companies influence both the epistemological and operational dynamics of peacekeeping. This not only diffuses authority over peacekeeping into the commercial market, it often happens with a very low degree of transparency. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author wishes to thank Åsne Kalland Aarstad (Århus University), the editor of International Peacekeeping and anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this article. The outcome is my responsibility. Notes The term PMSC is here understood to mean transnational commercial entities supplying security services and military support services. These services often include (but are not limited to) personal security, protection of assets and property, military or police training, security consulting, support for military operations and bases, demining and ordnance disposal, technical support for weapons management or military equipment, intelligence collection and analysis. For more on the reasons why the UN uses PMSCs, see Åse Gilje Østensen, ‘UN Use of Private Military and Security Companies: Practices and Policies’, SSR paper 3, Geneva: Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011. See e.g. Christopher Spearin, ‘UN Peacekeeping and the International Private Military and Security Industry’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.18, No.2, 2011, pp.196–209; Oldrich Bures, ‘Private Military Companies: A Second Best Peacekeeping Option?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.4, 2005, pp.533–46; Malcolm Patterson, ‘A Corporate Alternative to United Nations Ad Hoc Military Deployments’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol.13, No 2, 2008, pp.215–32; Lou Pingeot, ‘Private Military & Security Companies and the UN: A Dangerous Partnership’, New York: Global Policy Forum, 2012; Østensen (see n.2 above). See e.g. Marc von Boemcken, ‘Liaisons Dangereuses: The Cooperation between Private Security Companies and Humanitarian Aid Agencies’, in Thomas Jäger and Gerhard Kümmel (eds), Private Security Companies: Chances, Problems, Pitfalls, and Prospects, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007, pp.261–63; Deborah Avant, ‘The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force’, International Studies Perspectives, Vol.5, No.2, 2004, pp.153–57; Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico, ‘The Use of Private Security Providers and Services in Humanitarian Operations’, report 27, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008; James Cockayne, ‘Commercial Security in Humanitarian and Post–Conflict Settings – An Explorative Study’, New York: International Peace Academy, 2006; Christopher Spearin, ‘Humanitarian Non–Governmental Organisations and International Private Security Companies: The Humanitarian Challenges of Moulding a Marketplace’, policy paper 16, Geneva: Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007. Anna Leander, ‘The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military Companies’, Millennium, Vol.33, No.3, 2005, pp.803–25; Didier Bigo, ‘Globalized (in)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon’, in Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala (eds), Iliberal Practices of Liberal Regimes, the (in)Security Games, London: Routledge, 2008, pp.10–48; Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Abrahamsen and Williams, ‘Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages in International Politics’, International Political Sociology, Vol.3, No.1, 2009, p.5. Abrahamsen and Williams (see n.5 above). Bigo (see n.5 above), p.23. Abrahamsen and Williams (see n.5 above), p.222; Anna Leander, ‘Practices (Re)producing Orders: Understanding the Role of Business in Global Security Governance’, in Morten Ougaard and Leander (eds), Business and Global Governance, London: Routledge, 2010, pp.57–77. Bigo (see n.5 above), p.26. Leander (see n.5 above); Leander, ‘Privatizing the Politics of Protection: Military Companies and the Definition of Security Concerns’, in Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson and Raia Prokhovnik (eds), The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, London: Routledge, 2006, pp.19–33. Elke Krahmann, ‘Security: Collective Good or Commodity?’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol.14, No.3, 2008, pp.379–404. See also Peter M. Haas, ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization, Vol.46, No.1, 1992, pp.1–35. Bures (n.3 above) discusses the pros and cons of potential large–scale outsourcing of UN peacekeeping operations. The Peace Operations Institute (affiliated with the PMSC trade organization, International Stability Operations Association) suggests that PMSCs should increasingly complement the UN in peace and stability operations worldwide. See Christopher M. Rochester, ‘A Private Alternative to a Standing United Nations Peacekeeping Force’, Washington DC: Peace Operations Institute, 2007. Similarly, Patterson suggests the establishment of a contractor peacekeeping and intervention force under the auspices of an envisaged UN entity that he names ‘the UN Directorate of Military Contracting’. Malcolm Hugh Patterson, Privatizing Peace: A Corporate Adjunct to United Nations Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. There are other, unsolicited papers, with similar ideas; none have been treated with much credence in the UN, nor seriously studied as a potentially viable solution to many of the issues facing peacekeeping operations. Author's communication with anonymous UN Department of Safety and Security source, 18 Apr. 2011. Spearin (see n.3 above). According to a UN Department of Safety and Security source (see n.14 above), advice and training are procured only infrequently. A 2011 attempt by UNDP to buy security analytical services was stopped by member states. UN procurement of PMSC services is sometimes done from the field, but should normally be handled by the UN's procurement organizations, the UN Procurement Division (UNPD), or the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Local companies are often preferred in the belief that local guards will be more acceptable to the local population, add to the local economy and constitute good sources of detailed security information. Østensen (see n.2 above), p.9. While most of the procured guarding is unarmed, in some situations PMSCs are used in exceptionally difficult circumstances that require the provision of a proactive armed presence to prevent attacks and to ensure continued presence. UN officials also report that the use of armed private security is becoming more common. Stephen Mathias, Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, ‘Regulating and Monitoring Private Military and Security Companies in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, presentation at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law XXXV Roundtable, San Remo, 6–8 Sept. 2012 (at: www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/Mathias.pdf). Hart Security, ‘Selected Experience’ (at: www.hartsecurity.com/aboutus_selectedexperience.asp#un). Østensen (n.2 above), p.28. UN Procurement Division, ‘2011 Contract Awards for Field Missions – Others’ (at: www.un.org/depts/ptd/11_field_contract_others.htm). Author's phone conversation with official of the Field Procurement Liaison Team, DFS, 22 Dec. 2010. Østensen (see n.2 above), p.17. Among the ‘implementing partners’ of the UN Mine Action Service are the Olive Group, EODT Technology, Ronco, and the former ArmorGroup Mine Action (now called G4S Ordnance Management). UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, ‘Comprehensive Management Audit of the Department of Safety and Security’, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UN Doc. A/63/379, 26 Sept. 2008, p.7. See Østensen (n.2 above) and Pingeot (n.3 above) for more information on this particular case. See e.g. Marjorie Ann Browne, ‘UN Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress’, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 Feb. 2011, p.19. Nina M. Serafino, ‘Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions’, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004. See PAE, ‘CivPol Description by Task Order’ (at: www.paegroup.com/career-justice-support-description). Nina M. Serafino, ‘The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress’, Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009, p.1. Ibid., p.18. Northrop Grumman Corp., ‘U.S. Department of State Awards Northrop Grumman African Training Contract’, 6 Jul. 2010 (at: http://investor.northropgrumman.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=112386&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1444523&highlight=). UN missions with GPOI-trained personnel include MINURSO in Western Sahara, MINUSTAH in Haiti, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ONUB in Burundi, UNFIL in Lebanon, UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNMIL in Liberia, UNMIS in Sudan, UNOCI in the Ivory Coast, and UNOSIL in Sierra Leone. GPOI-trained troops also contributed to UNAMID, the joint AU–UN operation in Darfur. Serafino (see n.30 above), p.2. The scope of this article allows only for a brief discussion of how some of the more central PMSC services may grant PMSCs influence of UN operations. Leander (see n.5 above), p.817. Lee Rouse, Private Military Contractor for Hire, Baltimore: PublishAmerica, 2008, p. 71. L3 MPRI, ‘Military Educations and Training’, 1 Jun. 2012 (at: www.mpri.com/web/index.php/content/what_we_do/military_education). Notably, MPRI/ Engility also writes manuals for contract support in the field, which is likely to do little to constrain contractor influence in military or peacekeeping operations. Sean McFate, ‘Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol.35, No.118, 2008, p.652. The GPOI is denoted a ‘train and equip’ programme. Department of State Official Blog, ‘Diplomats and Military Partner to Train and Equip Peacekeepers’, 18 Nov. 2010 (at: http://blogs.state.gov/index.php/site/entry/train_and_equip_peacekeepers). US Government Accountability Office, ‘Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements are Needed’, Report to Congressional Committees, June 2008, p.23. The UN was tasked with transforming the Liberian National Police, while the US took responsibility for demobilizing and reconstituting the Armed Forces of Liberia. The US in turn outsourced its commitment entirely to DynCorp and PAE. McFate (see n.39 above), p.646. McFate was Programme Manager for DynCorp in Liberia. McFate (see n.39 above), p.651. Ibid. See in particular Preamble and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Serafino (see n.30 above), p.17. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ‘The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies 2010’ (at: www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100). UN Procurement Division (at: www.un.org/depts/ptd/04_others_contract.htm). Krahmann (see n.12 above), pp. 390–91. Pingeot (see n.3 above), p.38. Mark Duffield, ‘Risk-Management and the Fortified Aid Compound: Everyday Life in Post-Interventionary Society’, Journal of Intervention and State Building, Vol.4, No.4, 2010, p.463. Melanie Ramjoué, ‘Improving UN Intelligence through Civil-Military Collaboration: Lessons from the Joint Mission Analysis Centres’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.18, No.4, 2012, pp.469–70. Philip Shetler-Jones, ‘Intelligence in Integrated UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Joint Mission Analysis Centre’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, 2008, pp.518–19. Leander (see n.5 above), p.811. Ibid. p.814. Currently, Rheinmetall Defence, NAMMO, Saab, the Swiss Ammunition Enterprise Corporation, and Ukroboronservice SC are weapons and ammunitions manufacturers and UN demining implementing partners. Ronco, ‘Security’ (at: www.roncoconsulting.com/services/security). For more on (lack of) policies within the UN up to 2011, see Østensen (n.2 above), pp.40–63. For an analysis of the discursive changes which have taken place within these bodies, see Elke Krahmann, ‘From ‘Mercenaries’ to ‘Private Security Contractors’: The Re(construction of Armed Security Providers in International Legal Discourses', Millennium, Vol.40, No.2, 2012, pp.343–63. The policy includes guidelines, vendor criteria, Terms of Reference, a model contract and a use of deadly force policy. Mathias (see n.18 above). US Institute for Peace, ‘Building Civilian Capacity for U.S: Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Component’, special report 118, Washington DC: US Institute for Peace, Apr. 2004, p.4. US Government Accountability Office (see n.40 above), pp.28–29. Krahmann (see n.12 above).