Educational Theory · 2004 · 32 citations · 0 references
HumanitiesPhilosophyContinental PhilosophyEpistemologyModern PhilosophyCurriculum PhilosophyEpistemic NormativityEpistemic FoundationsNormativity CritiquePractical Normativity
The study examines how philosophers of education have adopted the antifoundationalist turn in epistemology and its practical relevance. The authors analyze the reception of antifoundationalism, test its tenability against objections, and compare the resulting contextualist normativity with traditional and Frankfurt School normativities. They find that antifoundationalist philosophers shift focus from epistemology to commitment, redefining practical relevance as highlighting the restrictive, contextual implications of educational judgments rather than improving foundational bases.
We analyzed how philosophers of education received the ‘antifoundationalist’ turn in epistemology, particularly with respect to its practical relevance. Our main conclusion is, that antifoundationalist philosophers of education discharge the primacy of epistemology, replacing it by a primacy of commitment. Consequently, they no longer understand practical relevance in terms of contributing to ‘improved’ foundations for educational judgement. Stressing the contextual embedding of any justification, they rather concentrate on demonstrating the restrictive, excluding, implications of any educational judgement. We check the tenability of this position against some critical objections. Finally, we contrast the ‘new normativity’ that emerges from this contextualist approach with traditional, prescriptive normativity as well as with the non‐prescriptive normativity of the Frankfurt School from the nineteen‐seventies.