Licensing Tacit Knowledge: Intellectual Property Rights And The Market For Know-How

Ashish Arora

Economics of Innovation and New Technology · 1995 · 316 citations · 19 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Technology transfer requires more than patent permission; the transfer of know‑how is essential but difficult to codify, costly, and hard to contract. The study aims to demonstrate that simple arms‑length contracts can facilitate the transfer of know‑how. This is achieved through a principal‑agent model that analyzes contract design. The model shows that the success of such contracts hinges on the complementarity between know‑how and patents, explains why they are bundled, highlights licensing limitations, and reveals that broader patent scope improves transfer efficiency even when know‑how is unprotected. Keywords: Know‑how licensing patents; classification: 034, L14.

Abstract

Abstract Technology transfer involves more than just the permission to use knowledge covered by patents; the transfer of know-how is critical to the successful utilization of the transferred technology. However, know-how is typically difficult to codify, costly to transfer, and hence, difficult to contract upon. Using a principal-agent model I show that simple arms length contracts can accomplish the transfer know-how. The key to the success of arms length contracts is the complementarity between know-how and patents. The model explains why patents and know-how are bundled together in licensing contracts. It shows why licensing has limitations as a strategy for appropriating rents from innovation. The paper points to the key role that patent scope plays in determining the efficiency of know-how transfer and shows that broader patents can improve the efficiency of technology transfer, even when important components of the technology (know-how) are not protected by patents. Keywords: Know-howlicensingpatents J.E.L. classification: 034, L14

References

19