Why Monist Critiques Feed Value Pluralism

Abstract

In the recent collection of essays on The Legacy of Isaiah Berlin, Ronald Dworkin challenges Berlin's most important philosophical contribu tion, particularly to political philosophy. Dworkin identifies the princi ple source of Berlin's growing and continuing influence as idea of value pluralism.1 He recognizes the originality, interest and ambition of Berlin's pluralist thesis, but declares, do not think that he sustained that very broad claim (90)—Berlin could not successfully defend value pluralism. Dworkin's article then goes on to illustrate Berlin's failure by elaborating a defiantly value monist critique of Berlin's value pluralist legacy. This article attempts to turn the tables on Dworkin by showing not only why his critique of Berlin fails, but also why such a monist cri tique actually strengthens the pluralist thesis. The failure of Dworkin's critique is rooted in his implausible inter pretation of two central elements of Berlin's pluralism—specifically, (1) its characterization of value conflict (as necessarily tragic), and (2) its paradigm case of liberty conflicting with equality (as reliant on a counter intuitive sense of liberty). Once Berlin's position is better understood, Dworkin's critique loses much of its force. An examination of their ex change reveals that some key points of dispute wind up favoring the plu ralists, while others remain unsettled, perhaps irresolvable. I will argue that the unresolved character of this longstanding debate also favors (Berlin's) pluralism. To see why, however, we need to consider what the central issue is in monist-pluralist debate. Berlin describes the main points of the monist-pluralist debate as follows: