Strength in Numbers?

TLDR

Small EU states are vastly overrepresented in the Parliament and Council, and vote‑buying models predict that such overrepresentation will systematically favor those states in fiscal transfers. The article investigates how territorial representation relates to fiscal redistribution within the European Union. Empirical analysis of the EC/EU from 1977 to 1999 shows a strong linear relationship between votes and per‑capita transfers in each period. This relationship holds for agricultural, regional development, and total net transfers, underscoring the link between representation and redistribution as the EU prepares to enlarge.

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between territorial representation and fiscal redistribution in the European Union. Given that small states are vastly overrepresented in both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, models of legislative vote-buying predict that overrepresented member states will be systematically favored in the distribution of EU fiscal transfers. Empirical analysis of each manifestation of the EC or EU from 1977 to 1999 reveals a strong linear relationship between votes and transfers per capita during each period. This is true for both agricultural and regional development transfers as well as total net transfers. The paper concludes by reflecting on the importance of the connection between representation and redistribution as the European Union prepares to enlarge.