The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls

TLDR

Recent debate has focused on whether charging an entrance fee to customers joining a queue is a rational policy, a topic with few published discussions and largely qualitative arguments, analogous to traffic congestion control. The study demonstrates that queueing models can yield analogous conclusions to traffic economics when two basic conditions are met.

Abstract

SOME DISCUSSION has arisen recently as to whether the imposition of an entrance fee on arriving customers who wish to be serviced by a station and hence join a waiting line is a rational measure. Not much of this discussion has appeared in print; indeed this author is aware of only three short communications, representing an exchange of arguments between Leeman [1, 2] and Saaty [3]. The ideas advanced there were of qualitative character and no attempt was made to quantify the arguments. The problem under consideration is obviously analogous to one that arises in connection with the control of vehicular traffic congestion on a road network. It has been argued2 by traffic economists that the individual car driver on making an optimal routing choice for himself-does not optimize the system at large. The purpose of this communication is to demonstrate that, indeed, analogous conclusions can be drawn for queueing models if two basic conditions are satisfied: