Groupthink and the space shuttle challenger accident: Toward a quantitative case analysis

Abstract

Abstract Research on historical cases of policy decisions thought to involve groupthink nearly always has been qualitative, rather than quantitative. We propose that observable antecedents and consequences can be used to code incidents in a group's decision process, thereby providing the basis for more rigorous, quantitative analyses. As a first step toward such a quantitative case analysis, we coded statements from the investigative report on the space shuttle Challenger accident as positive or negative instances of the observable antecedents and consequences of groupthink. Positive instances of groupthink were twice as frequent as negative instances. More importantly, during the 24 hours prior to launch the ratio of positive to negative instances increased, then remained high. These results are consistent with the notion that the decision to launch the Challenger involved groupthink and provide a first step toward more rigorous quantitative analysis of historical or current decision processes.