Agree now – pay later: escaping the joint decision trap in the evolution of the EU emission trading system

Abstract

This article seeks to refine the joint decision trap model by introducing additional time-based exit mechanisms. The procrastination of decisions, temporary derogation, and transitory compensation enable European Union (EU) member states to escape gridlock by distributing the costs and benefits of a decision over the time axis. In addition, time-based mechanisms not only help to overcome stalemate in policy-making, they also lock member states into a policy regime that may gradually be strengthened once delayed measures take effect. We demonstrate the workings of time-based strategies for the case of the EU's Emission Trading System (EU ETS). Given the diversity of EU member states' interests, the evolution of a mandatory and increasingly ambitious EU ETS presents a puzzle for EU scholars. While established exit mechanisms do not provide conclusive explanations for the case of the EU ETS, we argue that time-based strategies were key to move the EU's policy on emission trading forward.