Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting

Partha Dasgupta, Eric Maskin

American Economic Review · 2005 · 282 citations · 15 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Preferences such as urges and cravings are shaped by evolutionary forces to promote survival‑maximizing choices. The study proposes an evolutionary explanation for intertemporal preference reversals attributed to hyperbolic discounting. The authors model how evolutionary pressures produce optimal preferences that shift from patient to impatient as the time horizon shortens under uncertain payoff realization times. Uncertain payoff times cause optimal preferences to be patient over long horizons but switch to impatience over short horizons, producing reversals that remain optimal, while choices outside the evolutionary norm can trigger inconsistent behavior that learning and self‑commitments can correct. The abstract was adapted from a prior version of the item.

Abstract

We propose an evolutionary explanation for the pattern of intertemporal preference reversals often ascribed to hyperbolic discounting. We take the view that preferences—manifested, for example, in urges, cravings, and inclinations— are the outcome of evolutionary forces, and so will induce animals or humans to make survival-maximizing choices in decision problems. We show that if the typical problem involves payoffs whose realization times are uncertain, then optimal preferences give rise to relatively patient behavior when the time horizon is long but induce a switch to impatience when the horizon grows short. Such reversals do not entail dynamic inconsistency in typical decision problems; behavior there is optimal. However, if a decision-maker is confronted with a choice for which the realization-time uncertainty falls outside the evolutionary norm, her preferences may well prompt her to behave inconsistently. We argue that, if such a choice problem recurs, her evolutionarily endowed aability to learn will lead her to make self-commitments against these urges. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

References

15