Security proof for quantum-key-distribution systems with threshold detectors

Abstract

In this paper, we rigorously prove the intuition that in security proofs for the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol, one may regard an incoming signal to Bob as a qubit state. From this result, it follows that all security proofs for BB84 protocol based on a virtual qubit entanglement distillation protocol, which was originally proposed by Lo and Chau [Science 283, 2050 (1999)] and by Shor and Preskill [Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000)], are all valid even if Bob's actual apparatus cannot distill a qubit state explicitly. As a consequence, especially, the well-known result that a higher bit error rate of 20% can be tolerated for BB84 protocol by using two-way classical communications is still valid even when Bob uses threshold detectors. Using the same technique, we also prove the security of Bennett-Brassard-Mermin 1992 (BBM92) protocol where Alice and Bob both use threshold detectors.