The fallacy of placing confidence in confidence intervals

Richard D. Morey, Rink Hoekstra, Jeffrey N. Rouder, Michael Lee, Eric‐Jan Wagenmakers

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · 2015 · 613 citations · 69 references

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TL;DR

Interval estimates, particularly confidence intervals, are widely used to quantify sampling uncertainty, with their width and confidence level traditionally interpreted as indicators of precision and plausibility of the true parameter. The authors caution against relying on confidence interval theory to justify interval estimates and advocate for alternative interval estimation frameworks. Their examples show that confidence intervals frequently lack the claimed properties and can produce unjustified or arbitrary inferences.

Abstract

Interval estimates – estimates of parameters that include an allowance for sampling uncertainty – have long been touted as a key component of statistical analyses. There are several kinds of interval estimates, but the most popular are confidence intervals (CIs): intervals that contain the true parameter value in some known proportion of repeated samples, on average. The width of confidence intervals is thought to index the precision of an estimate; CIs are thought to be a guide to which parameter values are plausible or reasonable; and the confidence coefficient of the interval (e.g., 95 %) is thought to index the plausibility that the true parameter is included in the interval. We show in a number of examples that CIs do not necessarily have any of these properties, and can lead to unjustified or arbitrary inferences. For this reason, we caution against relying upon confidence interval theory to justify interval estimates, and suggest that other theories of interval estimation should be used instead.

References

69