Duke journal of comparative & international law · 2006 · 14 citations · 0 references
Open access
LawInternational LawInternational RelationsInternational OrganizationsInternational Political TheoryPublic International LawForeign Policy Decision-makingInternational CooperationConduct Under State ControlInternational Relations TheoryInternational RulemakingRegime TheoryState Participation In Decision-making
INTRODUCTION There is not and never will be a field of international law and relations that succeeds in explaining individual or state conduct so completely as to permit the reliable prediction of specific state actions that will occur in distant, concrete circumstances. We cannot know whether the conditions necessary for cooperation will be present in the future, or how states will respond to the conditions that do exist. (1) So opined Professor Michael J. Glennon in his recent article How International Rules Die. (2) Given the messy reality of international relations, Glennon argues that we can never really know why states follow rules of international law, which is true enough. (3) We cannot enter into the minds of the policymakers. We can never know with absolute certainty why decision makers chose to sign, ratify, and follow the provisions of international legal regimes. But if international relations theory is to serve any useful purpose, it must seek to make some kind of evaluation--even if it is a contingent, imperfect one--of why states act as they do. Without such evaluation, there can be no framework for understanding the behavior of international actors and no guidance for policymakers. We believe that the problem lies not so much in the general project of political science, but rather in the nature of existing theories of international relations and international law. Each of the major theories--structural realism, modified structuralism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism--offers some insights into state behavior, but none is able to provide a comprehensive framework for understanding state behavior regarding international legal regimes. What is needed is a better theory, and that is what we have sought to formulate. To respond to the failure of existing theories, we have developed a new theory that we refer to as the theory of This theory provides a much stronger basis for understanding why states adhere to international legal regimes. This positional theory has been developed inductively through an examination in which we explore the participation of nineteen global and regional powers in four prominent treaty regimes: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Land Mine Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Based on this examination, we conclude that the most significant determinants of behavior are the position of that state in the international system as well as the nature of the treaty regime, the extent to which the regime infringes on state sovereignty, the nature of verification/enforcement arrangements of that regime, and the normativity of the treaty regime. This Article seeks to lay out the nature of our empirical study and to set forth the basic elements of this new theory. Part I develops the concept of and explore insights from traditional international relations theory and international legal theory relating to adherence. Part II discusses the methodology used in our investigation, including the case and country selection. Part III then provides a detailed examination of the motivations given by these states for adherence with respect to the four treaties. Concluding that traditional theories by themselves fail to predict adherence, Part IV lays out the contours of our positional theory of adherence. Finally, Part V examines the implications of this theory for foreign policymaking. I. ADHERENCE THEORY A. The Concept of Adherence Many international legal and relations scholars' have written about the concept of compliance. (5) Compliance is meant to reflect the actions of a state to follow the provisions of a particular treaty or rule of customary international law. (6) A state is said to be complying with a treaty or rule of customary international law if it is acting in accordance with the legal obligations established in that particular source of law. …