POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, POLICYMAKING PROCESSES, AND POLICY OUTCOMES AN INTERTEMPORAL TRANSACTIONS FRAMEWORK *

Abstract

Summary In sum, public policies in Argentina are sometimes too volatile, other times too rigid, they are not well coordinated across policymaking actors, and they tend to be of low quality (reflecting among other things insufficient investment in policymaking capabilities). VI.2. Brief Anatomy of the PMP in Argentina The above mentioned policy characteristics are explained in ST2003 as the result of a generalized incapacity to strike the intert emporal agreements necessary to sustain effective public policies (and to induce capacity -building for public policy purposes). The configuration and workings of political institutions in Argentina are not conducive to effective political compromise and cooperation. We briefly highlight below several (interactive) features that correspond to the determinants of political cooperation or lack thereof identified in Section V. Argentina shares some basic constitutional characteristics with the U.S. It has a Presidential, Bicameral and Federal organization of government (24 “provinces” with substantial constitutional powers). If a Martian who has read the institutional literature on American Politics were to land on Argentina and, without knowing anything about the country, were to grab a copy of the Constitution, he would form some expectations about the workings of the polity that would not be fulfilled upon closer scrutiny. For instance, our Martian will start by exploring the role of Congress in the p olicymaking process. The first thing he would notice is that Congress does not have such an important role in the making of policy. The actions and powers that he would expect to encounter in Congress, would fade in the direction of the Executive (not too surprising in Latin American perspective), but also, more surprisingly, in the direction of the governors of the provinces.