Infranet: Circumventing Web Censorship and Surveillance

Nick Feamster, Magdalena Bałazińska, Greg Harfst, Hari Balakrishnan, David R. Karger

2002 · 136 citations · 10 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Many countries and companies routinely block or monitor Internet access. The authors propose Infranet to enable clients to covertly retrieve censored content via cooperating web servers. Infranet establishes a covert channel over standard HTTP requests, encoding upstream commands in request sequences and hiding downstream content in steganographic images, and the authors present its design, prototype, security properties, and performance. Security analysis demonstrates that Infranet can bypass multiple sophisticated censorship methods.

Abstract

An increasing number of countries and companies routinely block or monitor access to parts of the Internet. To counteract these measures, we propose Infranet, a system that enables clients to surreptitiously retrieve sensitive content via cooperating Web servers distributed across the global Internet. These Infranet servers provide clients access to censored sites while continuing to host normal uncensored content. Infranet uses a tunnel protocol that provides a covert communication channel between its clients and servers, modulated over standard HTTP transactions that resemble innocuous Web browsing. In the upstream direction, Infranet clients send covert messages to Infranet servers by associating meaning to the sequence of HTTP requests being made. In the downstream direction, Infranet servers return content by hiding censored data in uncensored images using steganographic techniques. We describe the design, a prototype implementation, security properties, and performance of Infranet. Our security analysis shows that Infranet can successfully circumvent several sophisticated censoring techniques.

References

10